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Abstract 
Increasing energy prices have led to a renewed interest in development of electric vehicles. At the same time, many customers  
may view an electric vehicle as an inferior alternative to the gasoline-powered car, due to limited range, length of time 
required to recharge the car, and limited availability of the related infrastructure. Further, commercially available and well-
tested hybrid vehicle technology provides substantial fuel economy without requiring additional infrastructure investment; 
moreover, hybrid cars do not suffer from the range issue. This paper offers a first formal model of adoption of electric 
vehicles. We show that, depending on the values of the model’s parameters, a situation can arise where some of the 
commuters purchase an electric vehicle as their second car, in addition to purchasing a regular gasoline-powered car. At the 
same time, improvements in fuel economy similar to development of a hybrid vehicle technology can lead to wide-spread 
adoption of a hybrid vehicle as household’s only car. This paper will provide a framework model to analyze the question of 
electric vehicle adoption, which will be expanded in future research. 
 
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Program Committee. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing energy prices have led to a renewed interest in development of electric vehicles. Recent auto 
shows feature most major auto manufacturers presenting electric powered cars; a number of models (Nissan Leaf, 
Tesla Roadster, etc.) are offered for sale to the general public. Nissan plans to manufacture over 250,000 Leaf 
vehicles annually by end of 2013, using production facilities in Japan, USA, and England. Government policies 
have also shifted towards supporting electric vehicles: in a number of countries, government subsidies and/or tax 
incentives are available to buyers of electric cars. This market segment promises to be rather profitable for the 
auto manufacturers, as currently electric vehicles are priced to capture the cost savings they could deliver to 
customers in the age of high gasoline prices. Government provided incentives are intended to help customers 
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stomach the high purchase prices of electric cars: without the tax breaks, Nissan Leaf costs about $35,000 in the 
USA – about twice the price of Toyota Corolla, a fuel efficient gasoline-powered sedan. 
Increased attention of both government and manufacturers to electric cars is understandable; however, wide-
spread adoption of these vehicles is likely to encounter a number of rather difficult challenges. Limited and 
somewhat uncertain range, coupled with long recharge time and scarcity of charging stations may hinder 
adoption of electric cars by households. Additionally, development of infrastructure for charging electric vehicles 
(which involves both building charging stations and upgrading homes/garages to enable in-home charging of 
electric cars) may impose additional burden on the electric grid, potentially triggering the need to upgrade the 
latter as well, creating challenges for the electricity markets, and leading to increased environmental damage in 
the areas where coal is used to generate electricity. 
Interestingly, manufacturers and government promote electric vehicles despite the existence of well-tested 
hybrid gasoline-electric vehicle technology, which provides substantial fuel savings as compared to the gasoline-
powered vehicles. Toyota’s Prius model is an undisputed leader here: this vehicle has until the launch of 
Chevrolet Volt been considered the most efficient gasoline-powered passenger car commercially available on the 
US market. Chevrolet Volt is itself a different kind of hybrid vehicle. While Prius switches between electric and 
gasoline power depending on the driving conditions, charging the battery as the driver applies the brake; Volt 
uses electric power, switching to gasoline engine once the battery has discharged. In the end, the issue of whether 
it is socially optimal to allocate available resources to development of hybrid cars versus electric vehicles is an 
important and timely problem, which this study begins to address. 
In this paper, we offer a first formal model of adoption of electric vehicles. The modeling approach assumes 
that commuters live at different distances from their work and shopping destinations, and must use personal 
vehicles for both commuting and shopping needs. While all people are assumed to live within electric car’s range 
for work commute; some commuters live too far from their shopping destination to be able to use an electric 
vehicle for all their travel needs. We show that, depending on the values of the model’s parameters, a situation 
can arise where some of the commuters purchase an electric vehicle as their second car, in addition to purchasing 
a regular gasoline-powered car. At the same time, improvements in fuel economy similar to development of a 
hybrid vehicle technology can lead to wide-spread adoption of a hybrid vehicle as household’s only car. 
This study is not the last word in the electric vehicle debate. Quite to the contrary – we would like to start 
this debate. Our paper provides a framework model, which can be expanded upon in future research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a very brief overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 presents the modeling framework, and Section 4 extends it to analyze welfare implications of EV 
versus hybrid vehicle adoption by the manufacturers. Section 5 concludes with discussion of issues that can be 
addressed in future research. 
2. Relevant Literature 
Since electric vehicle adoption is in its infancy, sufficient data to allow systematic studies of EV demand 
have not yet been generated. Studies evaluating potential EV demand and effects are also scarce, represented by 
Kurani et al. (1996) and Lieven et al. (2011). Both studies use survey results to evaluate potential demand for 
electric vehicles, and suggest range and price as the most likely deterrents to their adoption. Lieven et al. also 
suggest based on their results that electric vehicles can potentially capture about 5 percent of the German car 
market (this would correspond to about 175,000 new electric vehicles per year). Graham-Rove et al. (2012), 
based on interviews with 40 owners of regular cars, who were given electric vehicles for a week, suggested 
limited range (along with range anxiety, which led drivers not to use all the vehicles’ features to maximize the 
range, generally diminishing pleasure and comfort) and the likelihood of further technological developments as 
barriers to EV adoption. 
In contrast to electric vehicles, hybrid gasoline-electric cars have been in use for a number of years, and 
achieved substantial degree of market penetration. The corresponding literature has appeared, focusing 
predominantly on quantification of the impact of incentives on sales of hybrid cars. In particular, Gallagher and 
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Muehlegger (2011) show that sales tax rebates increase demand by a higher magnitude than income tax 
incentives (the former represent an immediate discount, whereas the latter is an example of a deferred price 
reduction). Diamond (2009) reaches the same conclusion; however, he also suggests that higher gasoline prices is 
a more important driver of demand for hybrid vehicles than any of the tax incentives. Beresteanu and Li (2011) 
also conclude that rising gasoline prices were responsible for higher demand for hybrid cars by a larger 
magnitude as compared to tax subsidies. Chandra et al. (2010) estimate that tax rebates are responsible for about 
a quarter of all hybrid vehicles sold while rebate program was active; they also document some substitution to 
hybrids from both larger fuel inefficient and some smaller fuel efficient vehicles.  
Our modeling framework can be considered a very simplified case of the monocentric urban model, very 
popular in both urban and labor economics. Origins of this model can be traced to Alonso (1964) and Mills 
(1972). Further theoretical research in this area has led to development of multicentric models (e.g., Wieland, 
1987; Yinger, 1992). Most recently, the state of research in these employment-population location models has 
been described by Zenou (2009). 
3. Model 
3.1. Setup 
Our modeling exercise centers around the notion of commuters, who need to use personal vehicles to travel 
to work and to a leisure destination. Commuters are uniformly distributed along a linear street of unitary length; 
work at the same location (i.e., a central business district, or CBD). The leisure/shopping destination is located at 
the distance ߙ ൏ ͳ from the CBD, as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 General Model Setup 
Each commuter is then uniquely identified by its location on the street, denoted via ݔ א ሾͲǡͳሿ. We assume 
that no commuter is able to walk to work, and rule out the public transit option in our model – each commuter 
then requires a personal car to fulfill his/her travel needs. There are two car options available to our commuters: a 
‘regular’ car and an electric vehicle (EV). The difference between a regular and an electric car is that the single 
trip range of the latter is ʹ ൏ ݀ ൏ ʹሺͳ ൅ ߙሻ. This effectively means that while all commuters will be able to use 
the EV for work commute; for some people EV will not be a feasible option to travel to the leisure/shopping 
destination. We will further denote via 
ݎ ൌ ௗଶ െ ߙ          (1) 
the location of the marginal commuter that allows using EV for both work and leisure/shopping trips. That is, 
people located between CBD and ݎ will be able to use EV for all their travel needs; while commuters living 
between ݎ and 1 will need to keep their regular vehicle, at least for shopping trips. 
Over a certain time period (e.g., a week, a fortnight, or a month) each commuter makes ܰ trips to CBD, and 
one trip to leisure destination. That is, a commuter located at point ݔ covers the distance of ʹ൫ሺܰ ൅ ͳሻݔ ൅ ߙ൯ 
each period. Total cost of commute depends on the car(s) owned by the commuter. Specifically, suppose that cost 
CBD Leisure 
l=α l=1 
r 
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of car ownership over a period of time consists of fixed cost of ݌ monetary units per period (e.g., a periodic loan 
payment) and cost of driving of ͲǤͷݐ monetary units per mile. Using subscript ܥ for a regular car, and ܧ for an 
electric vehicle, we suppose the following relationships between these costs: 
݌஼ ൏ ݌ாǢ ݐ஼ ൐ ݐா          (2) 
These three inequalities mean that electric vehicle is characterized by lower variable but higher fixed cost as 
compared to the regular car.  
The set of choices a commuter faces will depend on whether he/she is capable of using an electric vehicle for 
all his/her travel needs (i.e., whether ݔ is to the right or to the left of ݎ). In the former case, the commuter’s 
choice will be between owning a regular car or an electric vehicle. We specify total benefit (utility) from owning 
a regular car as 
஼ܷ ൌ ݕ െ ݌஼ െ ݐ஼൫ሺܰ ൅ ͳሻݔ ൅ ߙ൯        (3) 
Here ݕ denotes consumer’s income. Correspondingly, benefit from owning an electric vehicle is:  
ாܷ ൌ ݕ െ ݌ா െ ݐா൫ሺܰ ൅ ͳሻݔ ൅ ߙ൯        (4) 
A commuter located at point ݔ will then choose an electric vehicle over a car if ாܷ ൐ ஼ܷ . Solving this inequality 
gives 
ݔ ൐ ௣ಶି௣಴ାఈሺ௧ಶି௧಴ሻሺ௧಴ି௧ಶሻሺேାଵሻ          (5) 
as the condition of electric car ownership by a consumer who lives within the EV range. We can further define 
via ݔଵ the location of a commuter, living within the EV range, who will be indifferent between owning a regular 
car and an electric car. Clearly: 
ݔଵ ൌ ௣ಶି௣಴ାఈሺ௧ಶି௧಴ሻሺ௧಴ି௧ಶሻሺேାଵሻ          (6) 
Now, if ݔଵ ൑ Ͳ, then all commuters living within the electric car range will own an EV; but where ݔଵ ൐ ݎ, no one 
located within the EV range will adopt an electric car. Finally, if ݔଵ א ሺͲǡ ݎሻ, then commuters located between 
points 0 and ݔଵ will not adopt an EV, while those located between ݔଵ and ݎ will. 
Next, consider the problem faced by commuters located in the interval ሺݎǡ ͳሿ. A representative commuter 
here faces a problem of retaining his regular car and buying an EV in addition to the regular car. In the latter 
case, EV will be used for commute to CBD, while regular car will be utilized for leisure trips. The benefit derived 
by consumer from ownership of two vehicles is given by: 
஼ܷାா ൌ ݕ െ ݌ா െ ݌஼ െ ݐாܰݔ െ ݐ஼ሺݔ ൅ ߙሻ       (7) 
This option will be preferred to owning only a regular car if: 
ݔ ൐ ௣ಶேሺ௧಴ି௧ಶሻ          (8) 
Similarly to what we have done above for commuters living within the EV range for all their travel needs; we can 
define location of a commuter indifferent between keeping his/her regular car as the only vehicle and purchasing 
an EV as the second car. Specifically, we define: 
ݔଶ ൌ ௣ಶேሺ௧಴ି௧ಶሻ          (9) 
Then, if ݔଶ ൏ ݎ, all commuters living outside of the EV range will purchase an EV as their second car. On the 
other hand, where ݔଶ ൐ ͳ, no one will buy the second car. Interestingly, location of the point ݔଶ does not depend 
on the periodic fixed cost of the regular car. 
3.2. Vehicle ownership patterns 
Depending on the parameters of the model, we can identify six possible outcomes resulting from the 
introduction of the EV. Share of households owning an EV will be determined as: 
ܵா ൌ ݉ܽݔ൛Ͳǡ݉݅݊ሼݎ െ ݔଵǡ ݎሽൟ ൅ ݉ܽݔ൛Ͳǡ݉݅݊ሼͳ െ ݎǡ ͳ െ ݔଶሽൟ     (10) 
 We will now proceed to characterize all the possible cases. 
Case 1: ݔଵ ൐ ݎǢݔଶ ൐ ͳ. This is a trivial outcome, where none of the commuters adopts an electric car. In this 
case, ܵா ൌ Ͳ 
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Case 2: ݔଵ ൑ ͲǢݔଶ ൏ ݎ. This case represents the other extreme, with every commuter adopting an EV. However, 
commuters located at ݔ א ሾͲǡ ݎሿ buy EV instead of a regular car, whereas people living at ݔ א ሺݎǡ ͳሿ buy an 
electric car as their second vehicle. Clearly, ܵா ൌ ͳ here. 
Case 3: ݔଵ ൐ ݎǢݎ ൑ ݔଶ ൏ ͳ. This is the case where some or all of the people living outside of the EV range 
purchase a second car. At the same time, no one living within the range adopts at electric vehicle. In this case, 
ܵா ൌ ͳ െ ݔଶ. 
Case 4: Ͳ ൏ ݔଵ ൑ ݎǢݔଶ ൐ ͳ. In this outcome, commuters living outside of the EV range do not buy a second car; 
whereas some of the commuters living within the EV range adopt an EV as their only vehicle, instead of a regular 
car. Under these circumstances, ܵா ൌ ݎ െ ݔଵ. 
Case 5: Ͳ ൏ ݔଵ ൑ ݎǢݔଶ ൏ ݎ. This is effectively case 2 with partial adoption of electric vehicles by commuters 
living within the EV range; ܵா ൌ ͳ െ ݔଵ. This is the first case, for which three distinct kinds of car ownership 
emerge: some commuters own only a regular car, others only an EV, and all commuters living outside of the EV 
range own two cars – both a regular car, which they use for leisure trips, and an EV, which is used for commute 
to the CBD. This case is visualized in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2 Car ownership pattern in Case 5 
Case 6: Ͳ ൏ ݔଵ ൑ ݎǢ ݎ ൏ ݔଶ ൑ ͳ. This is the most complex case of all. Under these parameter values, some 
commuters living within EV range switch to an electric car; and some commuters living further away from the 
CBD buy an EV as their second vehicle; ܵா ൌ ͳ ൅ ݎ െ ݔଵ െ ݔଶ. This case also deserves visualization – see 
Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3 Car ownership pattern in Case 6 
From the analysis we have performed up to now, we can see that there are certain differences in parameters 
which affect commuter’s vehicle ownership choice, depending on whether the commuter lives within or outside 
of the EV range. Specifically, distance to the leisure destination and fixed periodic cost of regular car ownership 
do not play a role for the commuter living outside of the EV range. This is understandable, as this commuter is 
pre-determined to use a gasoline-powered car for trips to leisure destination. In both cases, however, EV 
ownership is discouraged by higher fixed and variable costs associated with EV, and encouraged by higher 
variable cost of driving a gasoline-powered vehicle, and larger number of trips to the CBD, other things equal. 
All these results are very intuitive. 
3.3. Numerical example  
The numerical example we develop in this sub-section demonstrates, among other things, that none of the 
scenarios we developed in the previous sub-section can really be ruled out. For the purpose of clarity, we will fix 
CBD Leisure r ݔଵ 
Car EV Car and EV Car 
ݔଶ 
CBD Leisure r ݔଵ 
Car EV Car and EV 
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all the parameters except for the fixed periodic cost of ownership. Specifically, we will set ܰ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ߙ ൌ ͲǤͺǢ ݎ ൌ
ͲǤ͸Ǣݐா ൌ ͳǢݐ஼ ൌ ͺ. With these values, we get: 
ݔଵ ൌ ௣ಶି௣಴ିହǤ଺ଶଵ଻           (11)
ݔଶ ൌ ௣ಶଶଵ଴           (12) 
The second of the above expressions immediately leads us to deriving the range of values for ݌ா, for which 
commuters living outside of the EV range will buy an electric vehicle as the second car. Knowing that this range 
is defined by ݎ ൏ ݔଶ ൑ ͳ, which for our parameter values turns into ͲǤ͸ ൏ ݔଶ ൑ ͳ; we easily show that the 
second car will be bought by commuters living in between points 0.6 and 1 when: 
ͳʹ͸ ൏ ݌ா ൑ ʹͳͲ          (13) 
From expression for ݔଵ we can easily determine that all commuters living within the EV range will adopt an 
electric car if 
݌ா െ ݌஼ ൏ ͷǤ͸          (14) 
And no one will adopt provided: 
݌ா െ ݌஼ ൐ ͳ͵ͷǤͺ          (15) 
We can then determine the ranges of parameters ݌ா and ݌஼ , which will correspond to each of the cases we 
described above. Namely: 
- Case 1 (no one adopts an EV) will occur if ݌ா ൐ ʹͳͲ and ݌஼ ൏ ͹ͶǤʹ 
- Case 2 (everyone adopts) will take place for ݌ா ൑ ͳʹ͸ and ݌஼ ൏ ͳʹͲǤͶ and ݌ா െ ݌஼ ൏ ͷǤ͸ 
- Case 3 (no one within the range adopts, while some outside buy second car) is what we will have for 
ͳʹ͸ ൏ ݌ா ൑ ʹͳͲ and  ݌஼ ൏ ͹ͶǤʹ 
- Case 4 (only some of the commuters within the EV range adopt the electric vehicle) will happen for ݌ா ൐
ʹͳͲ and ݌ா െ ͳ͵ͷǤͺ ൑ ݌஼ ൏ ݌ா െ ͷǤ͸ 
- Case 5 (partial adoption by commuters within the EV range and full adoption outside of the range) will be 
the outcome for ݌ா ൑ ͳʹ͸ and ݌ா െ ݌஼ ൏ ͷǤ͸ 
- Case 6 (partial adoption of EV both within and outside of the range) is the outcome for ͳʹ͸ ൏ ݌ா ൑ ʹͳͲ and 
݌ா െ ͳ͵ͷǤͺ ൑ ݌஼ ൏ ݌ா െ ͷǤ͸ 
Overall, every case we have outlined previously is possible for some combination of our model’s parameters.  
We can thus claim that, based on this simple example, none of the six cases outlined above can be ruled out based 
on the structure of our model. 
 
4. Extension – electric car versus hybrid 
In this section, we will consider one simple extension of our model, of multiple possible ways to expand this 
analysis. Specifically, let us suppose that the society has certain resources, which can be devoted to developing 
either an electric vehicle, or a “hybrid” car, which in the language of our model will mean that a type H vehicle is 
created, so that: 
݌஼ ൏ ݌ு ൏ ݌ாǢ ݐ஼ ൐ ݐு ൐ ݐா        (16) 
The corresponding benefit (utility) associated with the hybrid car ownership is given by: 
ܷு ൌ ݕ െ ݌ு െ ݐு൫ሺܰ ൅ ͳሻݔ ൅ ߙ൯        (17) 
Since hybrid vehicle will have no range restrictions associated with it; the commuter’s problem is simplified 
to that of choosing between an regular and a hybrid car (note that we supposed that we can develop either an EV 
or a hybrid, but not both, so that all three alternatives will never be available to the commuter). The location of a 
commuter indifferent between a car and a hybrid is then given by: 
ݔு ൌ ௣ಹି௣಴ାఈሺ௧ಹି௧಴ሻሺ௧಴ି௧ಹሻሺேାଵሻ          (18) 
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Commuters located to the right of ݔு will be buying hybrid vehicles, and commuters located between ݔு and the 
CBD will purchase regular cars. Clearly, if ݔு ൏ Ͳ, everyone adopts a hybrid vehicle; and all commuters will 
stick to the regular cars if ݔு ൐ ͳ. 
Taking prices as given (we will return to this issue when discussing the model’s implications); the issue of 
social desirability of developing an electric vehicle or a hybrid car can be addressed by comparing the values for 
the consumer surplus in these two cases. Technically, a more complete analysis would also take into account the 
profit of the car manufacturers involved in the game; however, we leave this issue outside of the scope of our 
analysis, due to potential multitude of the possible market structures to be considered (an issue for a potentially 
fruitful future research agenda). Specifically, in the regular versus hybrid car problem, the consumer surplus is 
given by: 
ܥܵு ൌ ׬ ஼ܷ݀ݔ୫ୟ୶ሼ଴ǡ௑ಹሽ଴ ൅ ׬ ܷு݀ݔ
ଵ
୫୧୬ሼ௑ಹǡଵሽ        (19) 
For the case where ܺு א ሺͲǡͳሻ – we can call this an interior solution – we have: 
ܥܵு ൌ ݕ െ ݌ு െ ݐு ൬ߙ ൅ ଵଶ ሺܰ ൅ ͳሻ൰ ൅ ݔு൫݌ு െ ݌஼ ൅ ߙሺݐு െ ݐ஼ሻ൯ ൅ ݔுଶ
ଵ
ଶ ሺܰ ൅ ͳሻሺݐு െ ݐ஼ሻ (20) 
Using (18) and after some algebraic transformations, (20) can be simplified to: 
ܥܵு ൌ ݕ െ ݌ு െ ݐு ൬ߙ ൅ ଵଶ ሺܰ ൅ ͳሻ൰ ൅
ଵ
ଶ
ሾ௣ಹି௣಴ାఈሺ௧ಹି௧಴ሻሿమ
ሺ௧಴ି௧ಹሻሺேାଵሻ      (21) 
Consumer surplus in the case where commuters have the choice of a regular car and an electric vehicle is a 
more complicated issue to examine, due to the sheer number of possible patterns of car ownership, as discussed 
in the previous section of this paper. The most interesting cases for our purpose, however, are those involving 
some or all of the households purchasing an EV as their second car (i.e., cases 2, 3, 5, and 6). Let us elaborate on 
those scenarios. 
We will start from Case 2, as this is the simplest one to tackle. Recall that in this case, all commuters adopt 
an EV. The consumer surplus will in this case be: 
ܥܵଶ ൌ ׬ ாܷ݀ݔ௥଴ ൅ ׬ ஼ܷାா݀ݔ
ଵ
௥         (22) 
From this point on, in notation used for consumer surplus in cases involving electric vehicles, we will use 
subscript corresponding to the number of possible vehicle ownership scenario outlined in the corresponding sub-
section of this study. Simplifying and rearranging yields the following expression for the consumer surplus: 
ܥܵଶ ൌ ݕ െ ݌ா െ ሺͳ െ ݎሻ݌஼ െ ߙሺݎሺݐா െ ݐ஼ሻ ൅ ݐ஼ሻ ൅ ௥
మ
ଶ ሺݐ஼ െ ݐாሻ െ
ଵ
ଶ ሺܰݐா െ ݐ஼ሻ   (23) 
Comparing the two expressions for consumer surplus is not an analytically feasible exercise. We will 
therefore resort to providing a numerical example to demonstrate that depending on parameter values of the 
model, consumer welfare can be higher with in either of the two cases (recall that we have set out to evaluate 
whether commuters will be better off when facing the choice between an EV and a regular car or a hybrid vehicle 
and a regular gasoline car). 
As before, suppose ܰ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ߙ ൌ ͲǤͺǢ ݎ ൌ ͲǤ͸Ǣݐா ൌ ͳǢݐ஼ ൌ ͺ. Further, setting ݌ா ൌ ͳʹͲ and  ݌஼ ൌ ͳͳͷ 
results in universal adoption of electric vehicles. Let us now vary ݌ு and ݐு in between the bounds set by (16). 
Suppose ݌ு ൌ ͳͳ͹Ǥͷ. Simple numerical analysis then shows that development of a hybrid car rather than an EV 
results in higher consumer surplus for ݐு lower than approximately 2.6. Once this value is exceeded, EV is a 
preferred choice by the consumers. Generally, values of ݐு lower than 2.4 will result in a hybrid car being the 
preferred option for consumers for any feasible values of ݌ு  within the range stipulated by our numerical 
exercise. On the other hand, for any feasible values of ݌ு, values of ݐு higher than 2.7 will imply higher benefits 
for commuter from development of an EV. These results suggest that a fairly intuitive trade-off between the fixed 
and variable cost of car ownership. Further, in our example variable cost appears to play a more important role in 
defining which of the cases will result in higher welfare for the commuters. 
Vehicle ownership patterns implied by cases 5 and 6 are actually fairly similar in terms of welfare 
implications to case 2 we have just considered. Case 5 results in partial adoption of an EV by commuters living 
inside of the EV range. Case 6 involves partial adoption both within and outside of the range. We can safely 
suggest that if full adoption of EV outside of the electric vehicle’s range (e.g., everyone outside of the range 
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owning two cars) can be beneficial to commuters, same is probably true for partial adoption. Let us however pay 
closer attention to Case 3 – an ownership pattern involving some commuters outside of the EV range buying the 
second car, and no one switching within the range. Consumer surplus in this scenario is calculated as follows: 
ܥܵଷ ൌ ׬ ஼ܷ݀ݔ௑మ଴ ൅ ׬ ஼ܷାா݀ݔ
ଵ
௑మ         (24) 
This simplifies to the following rather complex expression: 
ܥܵଷ ൌ ݕ െ ݌஼ െ ߙݐ஼ െ ଵଶ ሺܰݐா െ ݐ஼ሻ ൅
௣ಶ
ேమሺ௧಴ି௧ಶሻమ ቂݐா ቀ
ଵ
ଶ ݌ாሺܰ െ ͳሻ െ ܰቁ െ ܰݐ஼ െ ݌ாቃ  (25) 
For the numerical example, we are taking the following parameters: ܰ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ߙ ൌ ͲǤͺǢ ݎ ൌ ͲǤͷǢݐா ൌ
ͳǢݐ஼ ൌ ͺ (we have only changed the range here). We set ݌ா ൌ ͳ͹ͷ and  ݌஼ ൌ ͸Ͳ, which yields ݔଵ ൌ ͲǤͷͲͶ and  
ݔଶ ൌ ͲǤͺ͵͵. Comparison of consumer surpluses suggests a very limited set of combinations of plausible values 
for ݌ு  and ݐு , which result in higher consumer surplus for with the hybrid vehicle than with the car. This 
outcome is possibly stipulated by limited adoption of EV as the second car. 
We have thus shown that in general the answer to the question of social desirability of development of an 
electric vehicle (which we defined as a car with high fixed but low variable cost of ownership, but a limited trip 
range) versus improving the existing technology to reduce variable cost of ownership at the expense of higher 
fixed cost, but without sacrificing the trip range depends on the model’s parameters. Even where adoption of an 
electric vehicle results in some commuters purchasing their second car instead of substituting the regular gasoline 
car for an EV; the resulting decrease in variable cost of ownership can justify the inconvenience of limited range 
and additional fixed cost. Of course, the numbers we have chosen for our numerical exercise are somewhat 
arbitrary, selected to suit the vehicle ownership scenarios we have analyzed. Further studies can make an effort at 
calibrating this setup to more realistic parameter values. 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
What we have developed here can be thought of as a framework for modeling adoption of an electric vehicle. 
A great number of issues remained outside of the scope of our analysis for now, and present an opportunity for 
future inquiry. In particular, we can identify the following opportunities for extending the model’s scope and 
subsequent applications. 
Perhaps most importantly, our framework does not currently examine the role of markets – indeed, both 
fixed and variable costs are exogenous to our model. Variable cost is less of a problem here, as we can safely 
assume that a commuter purchases gasoline and maintenance on competitive markets – then, variable cost of car 
ownership will simply reflect the marginal cost of providing these services (i.e., price of gasoline and oil 
changes), and can to a large degree be assumed exogenous. Same cannot however be assumed about the fixed 
costs, as car manufacturers are known to operate in imperfectly competitive markets. Therefore, extending our 
framework to models of oligopoly offers a fruitful extension for future research. Moreover, one can consider 
different market setups: a monopolist producing both regular and electric vehicles; a duopoly with one 
manufacturer offering regular cars, and a competitor selling electric vehicles only; and a more realistic oligopoly 
model, with two or more firms present in both market segments. The important problem will then be to consider 
which market structure delivers higher total market welfare. To bring our modeling exercise closer to reality, 
further studies can consider scenarios involving markets producing regular, hybrid, and electric vehicles, and 
commuters differentiated not only by their location, but also by socio-demographic characteristics, such as 
income. Further, commuters living outside of the EV range can choose to utilize services of car rental or car 
sharing industries for their trips to the leisure destination, and these industries can themselves respond to adoption 
of electric vehicles by commuters by changing their strategies. 
An important rationale used to justify government support for electric vehicle is reduction in pollution such a 
development can bring. The concept of negative externalities is invoked; suggesting that commuters will not 
account for the environmental harm their decision to purchase a gasoline-powered vehicle will create. This 
argument can be used to justify both subsidies to buyers of electric vehicles, and fuel taxes, or a combination of 
the two. Our study however points to another potential externality associated with electric vehicle manufacturing. 
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Namely, environmental harm is also created during the car manufacturing process, and some of the vehicle 
ownership patterns emerging in our model imply that introduction of an electric vehicle will result in more cars 
being produced, which will impact calculation of social welfare implications of EV introduction. 
Our model assumes otherwise homogeneous consumers living in fixed locations at different distances from 
the CBD. This stylized setup differs from reality in several important ways. First, commuters’ location is not 
fixed in the long run – people move closer to where they work, and availability of an electric vehicle may change 
commuters’ incentives with respect to how far from the CBD they are willing to live. Property prices may also be 
affected. Future modeling exercises can tackle this issue. Second, commuters’ location can be linked to people’s 
demographic characteristics. For instance, what if higher-income commuters choose to locate further away from 
the CBD, and we allow demand for travel to depend on commuter’s income? Our framework is well amenable to 
incorporating such scenarios. The third important limitation of our model relates to our assumption of fixed travel 
demand – among other things, this means that the issue of road congestion is left out of our framework. In fact, 
increased fuel efficiency leads to an increase in vehicle miles driven – a well-documented phenomenon known as 
the rebound effect (Small and van Dender, 2007). Making miles driven endogenous will also open door to 
analyzing implications of electric vehicle development and adoption for road congestion.  
We have indicated earlier in this paper that long-term establishment of electric vehicles will require certain 
infrastructure investment. This is an issue that can be incorporated into our framework as well. For instance, 
construction of a charging station at the leisure destination will increase the EV’s range (moreover, for ߙ ൏ ͳ and 
assuming the vehicle can be fully charged while the customer is at the leisure destination, such a charging station 
will place every commuter within the EV range, greatly simplifying our analysis). At the same time, for certain 
combinations of parameter values, a charging station will not increase the level of EV adoption in our 
framework; and it will not be impossible to come up with examples, where the cost of building and maintaining 
the charging station will not justify the benefits in the form of higher consumer surplus. 
We have also mentioned in the literature review that our modeling exercise resembles an over-simplified 
monocentric urban model. The urban location models have evolved since the first monocentric one was 
developed; thus, future studies can put our framework into the context of those models, further bringing future 
modeling exercises closer to reality. 
Last but not least, our modeling framework suggests clear and intuitive hypotheses for future empirical 
studies of EV adoption. Our model effectively predicts higher level of electric vehicle adoption in more densely 
populated areas, other things equal. 
Notwithstanding the above-listed possible extensions of our framework; we hope to see future studies 
calibrating the model we propose here, to enable practical applications of this framework to predicting demand 
for electric vehicles, as well as to evaluating effects of any proposed incentives to buyers of those vehicles. 
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